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ABSTRACT
Horizontal cooperation in logistics has gathered momentum in the last decade as a way to reach
economic as well as environmental benefits. In the literature, these benefits are most often assessed
through aggregation of demand and supply chain optimization of the partnership as a whole. How-
ever, such an approach ignores the individual preferences of the participating companies and forces
them to agree on a unique coalition objective. Companies with different (potentially conflicting)
preferences could improve their individual outcome by diverging from this joint solution. To account
for companies preferences, we propose an optimization framework that integrates the individual
partners’ interests directly in a cooperative model. The partners specify their preferences regarding
the decrease of logistical costs versus reduced CO2 emissions. Doing so, all stakeholders are more
likely to accept the solution, and the long-term viability of the collaboration is improved. First,
we formulate a multi-objective, multi-partner location-inventory model. Second, we distinguish two
approaches for solving it, each focusing primarily on one of these two dimensions. The result is a set
of Pareto-optimal solutions that support the decision and negotiation process. Third, we propose
and compare three different approaches to construct a unique solution which is fair and efficient
for the coalition. Extensive numerical results not only confirm the potential of collaboration but,
more importantly, also reveal valuable managerial insights on the effect of dissimilarities between
partners with respect to size, geographical overlap and operational preferences.
KEYWORDS
Horizontal Collaboration, Individual Partners’ Preferences, CO2 Emissions, Location-Inventory
Model, Multi-Objective Optimisation
Corresponding author. Address: Universite´ catholique de Louvain, Chausse´e de Binche, 151, 7000 Mons,
Belgium. Tel.: +32 65 323 513. ORCID identifier: 0000-0003-4406-1676
1. Research context and motivation
To be competitive in today’s demanding markets, it is no longer sufficient to operate
at minimum cost (Saad, Rahim, & Fernando, 2016). Companies are under pressure
to also ensure high customer service levels and to account for the growing awareness
with respect to environmental sustainability. Encouraged by public incentives and
the emergence of carbon taxes, more and more companies integrate emissions targets
into all levels of decision-making (Hovelaque & Bironneau, 2015). The low average
vehicle loading rates — currently between 57% and 68% in EU-28 countries (Creemers,
Woumans, Boute, & Belie¨n, 2017; Vargas, Patel, & Patel, 2018) — show huge potential
for improving the sustainability of logistical networks. At the same time, maintaining
high delivery frequencies is crucial to remain competitive.
A promising avenue to improve the efficiency as well as the sustainability of the
logistical operations is to engage in a collaboration. In this paper, the focus is on hori-
zontal cooperation, which is defined as “multiple companies (potentially competitors),
operating at the same level of the supply chain, that join forces with the aim of im-
proving their overall efficiency” (Cruijssen, 2006). Through active sharing of vehicles
and facilities, companies can achieve substantial economies of scale. This leads to more
efficient vehicle loading rates and a reduction in total kilometres driven, which posi-
tively impacts the operational costs as well as the carbon footprint of the collaborating
companies (Hacardiaux & Tancrez, 2019).
A key challenge when modelling and analyzing collaborative environments is that
companies remain independent entities with different (potentially conflicting) prefer-
ences regarding the characteristics of the logistical network, and with different sizes
(thus potentially different influences in the decision process). This challenge is most
often circumvented in the literature with two premises: focusing on the improvement
in one dimension and considering the coalition as a unique deciding entity. Existing re-
search typically relies on the assumption that all partners agree on a unique objective.
Mostly, only the reduction of total logistics costs is considered. Furthermore, customer
demands and the preferences of the collaborating partners are aggregated and, doing
so, the identity and independence of the partnering companies are ignored (Defryn,
So¨rensen, & Dullaert, 2019). Consequently, an optimal solution at the coalition level
can be sub-optimal at the individual partner level. This discrepancy creates an in-
centive for the partners to behave opportunistically and diverge from the proposed
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solution to improve their individual outcome. This potential mismatch between indi-
vidual partner and coalition objectives jeopardizes the long-term stability, and thus
success, of the collaboration.
In this paper, we investigate the design of a cooperative supply network that ex-
plicitly accounts for differences in the individual preferences with respect to costs and
CO2 emissions reduction, and the influence weight of each partner. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to analyze such a problem within the context of collabora-
tive logistics. The result is a multi-objective optimization framework that integrates
the individual partner preferences, in order to find a solution which is fair and efficient
for the coalition. We introduce and compare five different approaches to find such a
solution. The first two generate a set of Pareto-optimal solutions that can support the
negotiation and decision-making process. The other three approaches help companies
to highlight a unique solution based on predefined criteria. To support the presentation
and show the working of our framework, it is applied and validated on a multi-objective
location-inventory problem. Extensive computational experiments allow us to derive
managerial insights for strategic and tactical decision support, including partner se-
lection.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a literature
review and positions the contribution of our paper. In Section 3, the problem setting
and the multi-objective and multi-partner collaborative location-inventory model are
presented. The first two multi-objective solution approaches that rely on the construc-
tion of a Pareto frontier are discussed in Section 4. The other three approaches, aimed
at finding a unique solution, are introduced in Section 5. In Section 6, experimental
results are presented and relevant managerial insights are derived. Finally, Section 7
concludes our paper and presents ideas for future research.
2. Related literature
Due to its practical importance and promising benefits, collaboration in logistics has
attracted the interest of the research community over the last decade. Existing stud-
ies mainly focus on collaborative transport or distribution systems, where the main
motivation for companies to cooperate is an increased efficiency of the vehicle fleet
operations and thus a lower logistical cost (Gansterer & Hartl, 2018; Verdonck, 2017).
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Despite the potential environmental and economical benefits, the sharing of distribu-
tion centers or joint inventory management policies have not received large attention
from the research community. While location-inventory problems receive increasing
academic attention (Daskin & Maass, 2019; Farahani, Rashidi Bajgan, Fahimnia,
& Kaviani, 2015; Melo, Nickel, & Saldanha-Da-Gama, 2009), their application in a
horizontal cooperation context is novel. Verdonck, Beullens, Caris, Ramaekers, and
Janssens (2016) analyze the benefits of cooperative facility location in a horizontal
carrier cooperation. Solving the joint location-allocation problem leads to an average
reduction in facility opening and distribution costs of 9.1%. Tang, Lehue´de´, and Pe´ton
(2016) determine optimal locations for regional distribution centers in a collaborative
distribution network. Makaci, Reaidy, Evrard-Samuel, Botta-Genoulaz, and Monteiro
(2017) empirically study the sharing of warehouses among different companies to iden-
tify, among others, the KPIs and uncertainty sources. Hacardiaux and Tancrez (2018)
present a location-inventory model and demonstrate average savings around 22% in
terms of facility opening, transportation, cycle inventory, ordering and safety stock
costs when setting up a collaboration. A limited number of papers consider carbon
footprint reductions associated with the collaborative location-inventory model. Hac-
ardiaux and Tancrez (2019) analyze the impact of several market and partner char-
acteristics (e.g. vehicle capacity, facility opening cost, inventory holding cost, demand
variability) on the reduction of cost and CO2 emissions when collaborating. Stellingw-
erf, Laporte, Cruijssen, Kanellopoulos, and Bloemhof (2018) analyze the economic and
environmental benefits of joint route planning and vendor-managed inventory in the
context of collaborative food logistics. Results show significant savings in costs, emis-
sions, distance and travel time, and demonstrate the advantages of vendor-managed
inventory in the case under study. Ouhader and El Kyal (2017) propose a multi-
objective optimization model, including both facility location and routing decisions,
that maximizes costs reduction and job creation subject to a constraint on CO2 emis-
sions. Unlike the work presented in this paper, existing contributions focus exclusively
on coalition objectives and the individual preferences of partners are ignored.
Despite its inherent multi-objective nature, horizontal logistics collaboration has
mainly been studied from a single-objective perspective in the literature (Defryn et
al., 2019). Typically, the collaborative scenario is simulated by aggregating the cus-
tomers’ demand of the different partners, and a single-objective optimization model
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is then solved at the level of the coalition. For the cooperation to be viable, ensur-
ing significant collaborative savings in the long run, however, the individual partner
preferences need to be taken into account. A growing body of research exists on multi-
objective optimization in various logistics domains. A general overview of relevant
literature can be found in Ehrgott (2005), Caramia and Dell'Olmo (2008) and Deb
(2014). More specifically, multi-objective applications have been developed for vehi-
cle routing problems (Jozefowiez, Semet, & Talbi, 2008), facility location problems
(Farahani, SteadieSeifi, & Asgari, 2010) and inventory management (Tsou, 2008).
The consideration of multiple objectives in a horizontal cooperation context, however,
is a novel research domain. Kimms and Kozeletskyi (2017) develop a multi-objective
optimization model for the travelling salesman problem (TSP) with horizontal coop-
eration. Their goal is to simultaneously minimize travelling costs and maximize the
partner utility consequential to order assignment. In line with Kimms and Kozeletskyi
(2017), Defryn and So¨rensen (2018) solve a multi-objective collaborative TSP aimed
at minimizing both the total distance travelled and the customer time window viola-
tions. Wang et al. (2018) present a vehicle routing model which minimizes both the
operating costs and the number of vehicles in the context of collaborative customer
and vehicle sharing. Soysal, Bloemhof-Ruwaard, Haijema, and van der Vorst (2018)
model an inventory routing problem analyzing collaborative benefits in terms of mul-
tiple objectives, i.e., emissions, driving time and total logistics cost. While each of the
papers described above considers multiple objectives on the coalition level, none of
them account for individual partner preferences.
To the best of our knowledge, Defryn et al. (2019) are the only to describe and
investigate the inclusion of individual partners preferences in collaborative logisti-
cal planning. In their paper, they propose a framework that allows for a difference
in individual partner preferences while assuring maximal synergy creation through
collaboration. Our research work differs from theirs by developing a multi-objective
framework both at the coalition and at the individual partner level, accounting for
preferences in both costs and CO2 emissions reductions, and accounting for the indi-
vidual partners’ influence on the collaboration. Consequently, in this paper, there is
no need for coalition partners to agree on a single coalition objective, contrary to the
assumptions made by Defryn et al. (2019). Furthermore, our methodology is tested
and validated on a collaborative location-inventory problem aiming to minimize both
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the total logistical cost and the transportation CO2 emissions. Finally, we consider an
a priori stated preference articulation with respect to the effect of the collaboration on
both objectives. In other words, we analyze the current stand-alone situation for each
individual partner to state their preferences in advance. Again, this approach differs
from Defryn et al. (2019), in which an a posteriori preference articulation is assumed.
Based on our literature review, we conclude that multi-objective research in hori-
zontal logistics cooperation is scarce. Moreover, the focus is on routing or distribution
environments, and only the coalition level is typically considered. Since collaborating
companies remain independent entities with potentially conflicting goals, there is an
urgent need for more multi-objective, multi-partner models that can account for the
individuality of the partners and their preferences.
3. The multi-objective collaborative location-inventory problem
In this section, we formally introduce the multi-objective collaborative supply chain
network problem. We then formulate both objectives, the minimization of logistics
costs and the minimization of CO2 emissions, and finally we present our multi-objective
collaborative location-inventory model.
3.1. Problem definition
We are given a set of companies wishing to engage in a horizontal collaboration. Each
company produces one specific product in their own central plant. As illustrated in
Figure 1.a, each company currently has its own (set of) distribution centers (DCs),
from where they distribute their product to a group of retailers. We assume that each
individual company has independently optimized its distribution network given its
preferences regarding costs and CO2 emissions. Each company has opened an optimal
number of DCs, chosen their location and allocated the retailers. Cycle inventory is
also considered, in particular choosing the right shipment sizes for each transport.
To satisfy the uncertain demand during the lead time (which is proportional to the
traveled distance) safety stocks are kept at every DC.
Motivated by potential reductions in logistics costs and CO2 emissions, the com-
panies consider setting up a joint supply network in which they share their DCs and
vehicles, as illustrated in Figure 1.b. The following advantages can be expected (Hac-
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Figure 1.: Illustration of the delivery networks of two independent stand-alone compa-
nies (a), and of the joint delivery network of these companies when they are cooperating
(b).
ardiaux & Tancrez, 2019):
• As DCs are shared by the cooperating companies, the total number of DCs is
likely to reduce, while each company’s product will likely be delivered from more
DCs.
• The vehicle loading rates will improve due to the bundling of goods from multiple
companies for a shared customer.
• The total distance travelled will decrease for two reasons: retailers are delivered
from a potentially closer DC, and the improvement of the loading rate will reduce
the number of vehicles travelling (per time period).
Although products from different companies are stored in the same facilities, com-
panies keep their own cycle inventory and safety stock. We asssume direct deliveries
and single sourcing, meaning that all the products delivered to a specific retailer come
from a single DC, even if these products originate from different partners.
3.2. Logistics costs and CO2 emissions
The goal of the coalition is to design a supply chain network that balances the inter-
ests of all partners, relative to their two objectives: minimizing the logistics costs and
the CO2 emissions. In this section, we formulate the costs and emissions of an indi-
vidual partner in the coalition (using the mathematical notations listed in Table 1).
7
Each individual partner aims to minimize its own share of costs and emissions in the
coalition. As detailed below, to share the total logistics costs as well as the total CO2
emissions of the cooperation among partners, we apply proportional rules based on
the quantity of products shipped by each partner. In practice, proportional alloca-
tion methods are most commonly used due to their simplicity and the fact that they
facilitate communication among partners (Guajardo, 2018).
Table 1.: Overview of mathematical notations.
Sets and indices:
D = {1, ..., nD} Potential distribution center (DC) locations, indexed by d.
R = {1, ..., nR} Retailers, indexed by r.
I = {1, ..., nI} Companies, indexed by i.
Parameters:
F Fixed cost for opening a DC, in AC/period.
T Transportation cost per km for a vehicle, in AC/(km·vehicle).
Ddr Distance between DC d and retailer r, in km.
Hir Unit inventory holding cost at retailer r for a product of company i, in AC/(item·period).
hid Unit inventory holding cost at DC d for a product of company i, in AC/(item·period).
C Vehicle capacity, in items/vehicle.
Kid Fixed cost at DC d for placing an order to the plant of company i, in AC/order.
ziα Standard normal deviation associated with service level α
i at retailers, for company i.
LTdr Lead time between DC d and retailer r, in periods.
LT id Lead time between the central plant of company i and DC d, in periods.
λir Mean demand for products of company i at retailer r, in items/period.
Λr Mean demand for all products at retailer r, in items/period, i.e. Λr =
∑
i λ
i
r.
Λi Mean demand for products of company i for all retailers, in items/period, i.e. Λi =
∑
r λ
i
r.
Λ Mean total demand for all companies and all retailers, in items/period, i.e. Λ =
∑
r Λr.
σir Standard deviation of the demand for products of company i at retailer r, in items/period.
e CO2 emissions emitted by an empty vehicle in kg/km.
f CO2 emissions emitted by a fully loaded vehicle in kg/km.
Qdr Total shipment size (for all companies) from DC d to retailer r (decided a priori), in items/vehicle.
Decision Variables:
yd
{
1, if DC d is opened,
0, otherwise.
xdr
{
1, if DC d serves retailer r (for all products),
0, otherwise.
vi1d, v
i
2d Auxiliary variables for company i and DC d.
3.2.1. Objective 1: Minimizing logistics costs
The logistics costs comprise of the facility opening costs, the transportation costs and
the inventory costs. To share the facility costs, a proportional volume-based rule is
used such that each partner pays for the fraction of the DC it is storing its products
in. Regarding the transportation costs, we use a separate deliveries weighted allocation
rule, where, in a similar manner, each partner pays for each vehicle proportionally to
the volume its products occupy in it (Frisk, Go¨the-Lundgren, Jo¨rnsten, & Ro¨nnqvist,
2010). The transportation cost allocation is thus different for each retailer ( λ
i
r
Λr
). Finally,
as each company has its own cycle inventory and safety stock, the inventory costs can
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be directly allocated to a specific partner. The share of the logistics costs for a partner
i in the cooperation can thus be expressed as follows.
Λi
Λ
∑
d
F yd+
∑
r
λir
Λr
∑
d
T Ddr
Λr
Qdr
xdr+
∑
d,r
H ir
Qdr
2
λir
Λr
xdr+
∑
d
√
2Kid h
i
d λ
i
r xdr
+
∑
d
hid z
i
α
√
LT id
√∑
r
(σir)
2xdr +
∑
d,r
H ir z
i
α σ
i
r
√
LTdr xdr (1)
The terms of equation (1) represent, for company i, its share of facility opening
costs, its share of transportation costs (Λr/Qdr gives the number of shipments per
period to a retailer r), its cycle inventory costs at retailers, its cycle inventory and
ordering costs at DCs (assuming an EOQ inventory structure), its safety stock costs
at DCs and its safety stock costs at retailers (to reach service level α).
3.2.2. Objective 2: Minimizing CO2 emissions
To account for the CO2 emissions, we focus on transportation and use the formula
proposed by Pan, Ballot, and Fontane (2013), which is commonly accepted in the
literature (Danloup et al., 2015; Moutaoukil, Neubert, & Derrouiche, 2015; Ouhader
& El Kyal, 2017). This formula also has the advantage of accounting for the vehicle
loading rate, which is an important factor of improvement when cooperating. To allo-
cate the CO2 emissions among partners, we apply the polluter-pays principle (Kellner
& Otto, 2012). CO2 emissions are divided proportionally to the usage of the vehicles
(it is also a volume-based rule, λ
i
r
Λr
). This method for the allocation of emissions is
frequently applied by practitioners as it is efficient and easy to understand (Leenders,
Vela´zquez-Mart´ınez, & Fransoo, 2017). The share of CO2 emissions produced by a
partner i in the collaboration can be expressed as follows:
∑
r
λir
Λr
∑
d
[e
Λr
Qdr
+ (f − e)Λr
C
] Ddr xdr (2)
The share of CO2 emissions for company i, due to the deliveries to its retailers, is
composed of baseline emissions from an empty vehicle, to which emissions proportional
to the vehicle load are added. In the first part of equation (2), the CO2 emissions
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emitted by an empty vehicle per km (ev) are simply multiplied by the number of
trips. Then, the CO2 emissions related to the vehicle load (
fv− ev) are multiplied by
the volume of products expressed in full vehicles. To get the total CO2 emissions of
the supply chain, these emissions per km are multiplied by the distance, and summed
for all deliveries to retailers.
3.3. Multi-objective collaborative location-inventory model
In this section, we present our multi-objective collaborative location-inventory model.
Equations (1) and (2) provide two criteria that need to be minimized for each partner
in the cooperation, leading to a multi-objective and multi-partner optimization model
with 2nI objectives. The model aims to determine the number and locations of the
joint DCs, the allocation of the flows, as well as inventory decisions regarding the ship-
ment sizes and the safety stocks. Moreover, the model directly allocates the costs and
the CO2 emissions to the specific partners. It is formulated as a conic quadratic mixed
integer program, which has the advantage to be solvable by commercial optimization
softwares. Similarly to Atamtu¨rk, Berenguer, and Shen (2012) and Hacardiaux and
Tancrez (2019), the non-linearity in the logistics costs (see equation (1)) is moved to
the constraints using auxiliary variables vi1d and v
i
2d. In the final model, the objectives
are linear and the constraints are either linear or conic quadratic. Our multi-objective
collaborative location-inventory model is formulated as follows.
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min
Λi
Λ
∑
d
F yd +
∑
r
λir
Λr
∑
d
T Ddr
Λr
Qdr
xdr +
∑
d,r
H ir
Qdr
2
λir
Λr
xdr +
∑
d
√
2Kid h
i
d v
i
1d
+
∑
d,r
H ir z
i
α σ
i
r
√
LTdr xdr +
∑
d
hid z
i
α
√
LT id v
i
2d ∀i (3)
min
∑
r
λir
Λr
∑
d
[e
Λr
Qdr
+ (f − e)Λr
C
] Ddr xdr ∀i (4)
s.t.∑
r
λir (xdr)
2 ≤ (vi1d)2 ∀d, i (5)∑
r
(σir)
2 (xdr)
2 ≤ (vi2d)2 ∀d, i (6)∑
d
xdr = 1 ∀r (7)
xdr ≤ yd ∀d, r (8)
vi1d, v
i
2d ≥ 0 ∀d, i (9)
xdr, yd ∈ {0, 1} ∀d, r (10)
Equations (3) minimize the share of logistics costs of each partner and equations
(4) minimize the share of CO2 emissions of each partner in the cooperation (2nI
objectives). Constraints (5) and (6) define the auxiliary variables vi1d and v
i
2d, giving
the model its conic quadratic mixed integer program form (using xdr = x
2
dr and yd =
y2d). Constraints (7) ensure that each retailer is assigned to exactly one DC (single
sourcing). Constraints (8) ensure that a retailer can be served by a DC only if the
latter is opened. Constraints (9) impose non-negativity on the auxiliary variables, while
constraints (10) enforce the binary nature of decision variables xdr and yd. Note that
the shipment size decision, Qdr, is not treated as a variable when solving our model,
but rather as a parameter. We will show in Section 4 that Qdr can be computed a
priori, before solving the model, in a way that depends on the approach used to solve
model (3)-(10).
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4. Multi-objective optimization frameworks
Our multi-objective collaborative location-inventory model is challenging to solve due
to the number of objectives, which is equal to the number of partners in the cooperation
times two, 2nI . In this way, we could say that the objectives are multiple in two
dimensions: the logistics costs vs. the CO2 emissions on one hand, the multiple partners
on the other hand. In this section, we present two approaches to solve our multi-
objective model, where each approach tackles the problem starting from one of the
two dimensions in order to generate a specific Pareto frontier.
Even though only one solution is chosen in practice, generating these Pareto fronts
provides useful insights into the trade-off between costs and emissions on the one hand
and between the partners interests on the other hand. The cost effect of striving for
a particular emissions level (and vice versa) can be analyzed, next to the balance of
the partners benefits in various collaborative network solutions. Ultimately, this allows
collaborative partners to reflect on their preferences and engage in negotiations on the
costs-emissions strategy of the collaboration.
4.1. Articulation at the coalition level
In the first approach, we tackle the multi-objective problem by aggregating the in-
dividual partners, considering the coalition as a whole. In other words, we look at
the problem as if the coalition was one homogeneous decision entity (Hacardiaux &
Tancrez, 2019; Tang et al., 2016; Verdonck et al., 2016). The shares of all partners are
added up, leading to two objectives: the total coalition costs and the total coalition
emissions. Compared to (3)-(4), ∀i is replaced by ∑i (and the equation is simplified).
We obtain the following objectives.
min
∑
d
F yd +
∑
d,r
T Ddr
Λr
Qdr
xdr +
∑
d,r,i
H ir
Qdr
2
λir
Λr
xdr +
∑
d,i
√
2Kid h
i
d v
i
1d
+
∑
d,r,i
H ir z
i
α σ
i
r
√
LTdr xdr +
∑
d,i
hid z
i
α
√
LT id v
i
2d (11)
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min
∑
d,r
[e
Λr
Qdr
+ (f − e)Λr
C
] Ddr xdr (12)
4.1.1. Weighted sum method
To tackle the remaining bi-objective model, we apply the weighted sum method, with
a varying weight β, which reflects the relative importance of logistics costs versus CO2
emissions for the cooperation (Kim & de Weck, 2005; Marler & Arora, 2010). Both
objectives are combined and the following model is obtained.
min
∑
d
F yd +
∑
d,r
T Ddr
Λr
Qdr
xdr +
∑
d,r,i
H ir
Qdr
2
λir
Λr
xdr +
∑
d,i
√
2Kid h
i
d v
i
1d
+
∑
d,r,i
H ir z
i
α σ
i
r
√
LTdr xdr +
∑
d,i
hid z
i
α
√
LT id v
i
2d (13)
+ β
∑
d,r
[e
Λr
Qdr
+ (f − e)Λr
C
] Ddr xdr
s.t.
(5)− (10)
The weight β is refered to as the costs-emissions weight, and reveals how important
CO2 emissions are compared to logistics costs for the collaboration. A small β means
that the cooperation is focused on costs, while a large β reveals a higher environmental
attention. The parameter β can be interpreted as the monetary cost of CO2 emissions.
It can for example be related to carbon taxes or company reputation. The use of this
weight solves the problems of nature and proportionality between both objectives, as
they were originally expressed in euros and in kilograms of CO2.
As noted in Section 3.3, the shipment size Qdr can be computed prior to solving the
model. Deriving equation (13) with respect to Qdr, equaling the resulting expressions
to zero, and accounting for the vehicle capacity, we find the following closed-form
formula for the shipment size.
13
Qdr = min
(
C,
√
2 (T + β e)Ddr Λr∑
iH
i
r λ
i
r/Λr
)
(14)
Note that, as β is part of this equation, the ability to compute Qdr a priori is tied to
the use of the weighted sum method. This is the reason why, for our location-inventory
model, it is the preferred method to tackle the model with the two objectives (11)-(12).
4.1.2. Pareto front
Varying the value of β in model (13), the Pareto front balancing costs and CO2 emis-
sions at the coalition level can be computed. Figure 2 (black squares) represents this
Pareto front for an illustrative case with two partner companies. The first solution on
the left of the frontier is obtained by only minimizing the total logistics costs (β = 0).
For increasing values of β, we observe a reduction in CO2 emissions caused at first
by changes in the inventory policy. More specifically, the shipment size, and thus the
vehicles’ loading rate, is progressively increased, reducing the number of shipments
and the CO2 emissions, but increasing the inventory costs. Then, the CO2 emissions
are further decreased by opening additional DCs, which have a major impact on costs
(additional facility opening costs) and CO2 emissions (reduced travelled distances).
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3 DCs
4 DCs
5 DCs
6 DCs
7 DCs
8 DCs
Logistics costs
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Figure 2.: Balancing the logistics costs and the CO2 emissions on an illustrative case
with two companies p1 and p2: optimal solutions for the stand-alone companies (×
and ?) and sum of these two (dashed circle); Pareto front for the cooperation, varying
β (); and allocated shares for both companies of each Pareto front solution (
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For each solution of the Pareto front at the coalition level, the costs and CO2
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emissions can be shared among the partners using volume-based allocation rules (as
described in Section 3.2). For each partner, the resulting trade-off between the costs
share and the emissions share is illustrated in Figure 2 (empty circles). This allows
to assess the solutions at the individual partner level. In particular, a partner could
decide to reject a given solution because it violates rationality principles (Zolezzi &
Rudnick, 2002). Two rationality principles are discussed in the following.
Individual rationality means that a partner will not accept a solution that is worse
than its stand-alone situation. In other words, a partner will not accept to enter a
cooperation that causes him to increase its costs or its CO2 emissions. Only solutions
that dominate all stand-alone solutions will be accepted by all partners. If no such
solution exists, we can conclude that the collaboration will not be viable. In Figure
2, allocated individual shares above or on the right of the stand-alone solutions are
deemed unacceptable and crossed. If a cooperative solution is rejected by at least one
of the partners, this solution is inaccessible to the other partners even if acceptable
for them individually (see crossed solutions
⊗
in the acceptable area in Figure 2).
Collective rationality states that the cooperation should create synergy, implying
that it should decrease both the logistics costs and CO2 emissions. Solutions in the
Pareto front of the cooperation are thus acceptable if their cost is smaller than the
sum of the stand-alone costs and correspondingly for the CO2 emissions. In Figure
2, all depicted solutions satisfy those conditions since they are all situated under and
on the left of the solution summing the stand-alone cases (dashed circle). Note that
multiple Pareto optimal solutions remain and that only one can be implemented (see
Section 5).
4.2. Articulation at the partner level
In the second approach, we tackle the multi-objective problem starting by the balance
between the logistics costs and the CO2 emissions. For each partner i in the coalition,
these two objectives are added, accounting for its preferences regarding costs versus
emissions using βi. Similar to the β introduced in Section 4.1, βi can be interpreted
as the monetary cost for company i of emitting one kilogram of CO2, and denotes
the importance according to partner i of reducing the CO2 emissions compared to
reducing the logistics costs. It is referred to as the individual costs-emissions weight.
The resulting sum, which aggregates the direct logistics costs and the indirect costs
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coming from CO2 emissions, is referred to as the augmented cost (and noted AugC).
Each partner in the coalition aims to minimize its augmented cost, leading to the
following objectives.
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In our approach, the individual costs-emissions weights βi are supposed to be known.
They can easily be inferred from the stand-alone situation (before cooperation) as we
assume that each company has optimally designed its supply chain according to its
individual preferences. Using this concept of revealed preference articulation, it is not
necessary to ask the decision-makers to explicitly express their individual preferences
and avoids the use of untruthful information (Veldhuizen & Lamont, 2000).
4.2.1. Weighted sum method
In order to solve the remaining multi-objective model, we again apply a weighted
sum approach, as in Section 4.1 (Kim & de Weck, 2005; Marler & Arora, 2010). This
time, the weights γi are used. They are referred to as the partner influence weights, as
they reflect the relative influence of each partner in the coalition, i.e. how important
the reduction of the augmented cost of company i is compared to the reduction of the
augmented cost of its partners. The resulting model is the following.
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s.t.
(5)− (10)
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As previously noted, the shipment size Qdr can be computed a priori. Deriving
equation (16), equaling the resulting expressions to zero, and accounting for the vehicle
capacity, we find the following closed-form formula.
Qdr = min
(
C,
√
2 [
∑
i γ
i λir (T + β
i) e]Ddr∑
i γ
iH ir λ
i
r/Λr
)
(17)
4.2.2. Pareto front
Varying the partner influence weights (γi), single-objective optimization models can
be solved to generate the Pareto front, showing the trade-offs between the companies’
augmented costs. Figure 3 shows the Pareto front for an illustrative case with two
cooperating companies, where the first company gives priority to costs while the second
company has a higher preference for CO2 emissions (β
2 > β1). The first solution on
the left of the frontier is obtained by only minimizing the augmented cost of the cost-
focused partner (γ1 > 0 and γ2 = 0), i.e. supposing that the first company has all
the decision power in the cooperation. When the ratio γ2/γ1 increases, the emissions-
focused company gets more power in the decision process. The locations of the DCs will
be modified to get closer to its large customers. Moreover, as β2 > β1, the cooperation
will become more environmentally friendly, and more DCs will be opened to reduce
traveled distances. Finally, the last solution on the right of Figure 3 is the one that
best accommodates the preferences of the emissions-focused company (with γ1 = 0
and γ2 > 0).
5. Identifying unique solutions
In Section 4, we proposed two approaches to reduce the multi-dimensionality of our
model (3)-(10), leading to Pareto fronts that help decision-makers in designing a collab-
orative supply chain. The Pareto fronts balance the logistics costs and CO2 emissions of
the coalition (Section 4.1) or compromise the partners’ augmented costs (Section 4.2).
In this section, as a complement to these results, we propose three different ap-
proaches to identify a unique solution, that would be considered fair and efficient by
every partner. The first two approaches use a value for either β or γi in order to
generate a unique solution from the models (13) and (16) given in Section 4.1 and
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Figure 3.: Pareto front balancing the augmented costs of two cooperating companies
(with β2 > β1).
Section 4.2, respectively. The third approach aims to find a fair balance between the
individual benefits that horizontal cooperation generates for the partners. For each of
these three approaches, two methods are suggested, differing in terms of the way β
and γi are calculated and in the viewpoint on fairness of individual partner benefits,
respectively. These six methods are presented in Sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. They can be
applied as a complement to the analysis of the Pareto fronts (Section 4) to highlight
solutions that are particularly relevant, and serve as a starting point for collaborative
negotiations. Moreover, they have the advantage of being less computationally expen-
sive if the decision-makers prefer to bypass the Pareto fronts generation altogether.
They can also easily be used with more than two companies while the complexity
of the Pareto fronts representation increases with the number of partners. Finally, in
the context of a company looking to select a partner, unique solutions (rather than
Pareto fronts) make it easier to compare potential partners and assess potential fit
and benefits.
5.1. Costs-emissions weight β approach
In order to determine a unique solution for model (13), without generating the Pareto
front, the value of the collaboration’s costs-emissions preference weight, β, has to
be fixed. For this, we rely on the known preferences of each partner, βi, which can
be inferred from their stand-alone supply chain (see Section 4.2). In order for the
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cooperation’s β to be acceptable by all partners, each βi is accounted for in proportion
to the company’s importance. Two methods are presented here, which define this
importance based either on the demand volumes of the partners or on their augmented
costs. As discussed before, proportional techniques are the most commonly used in
practice as they are simple, support communication purposes and do not require a
substantial amount of data (Guajardo, 2018).
• Volume weighted βV ol
In the cooperation literature, allocation and aggregation techniques often rely
on demand volumes (Guajardo & Ro¨nnqvist, 2016). Following this common prac-
tice, in this first method, β is computed as the weighted average of the partner
preferences (βi), weighted by their demand volume, as follows.
βV ol =
∑
i
βi
Λi
Λ
(18)
This volume weighted computation naturally favors the largest company, giv-
ing its preference a higher importance. This coincides with the research results
of Cruijssen, Cools, and Dullaert (2007) stating that larger coalition players are
the most powerful partners in practice.
• Augmented cost weighted βAugC
Next to demand volumes, stand-alone costs are also often used as a criterion
for collaborative aggregation or allocation purposes (Guajardo & Ro¨nnqvist,
2016). Accordingly, our second method computes β as the weighted average of
the preferences βi weighted by the stand-alone augmented cost. With CiSA being
the stand-alone cost of partner i and EiSA its CO2 emissions, the stand-alone
augmented cost of partner i can be computed as AugCiSA = C
i
SA + β
iEiSA. The
cooperation’s preference weight β can then be formulated as follows.
βAugC =
∑
i
βi
AugCiSA∑
j AugC
j
SA
(19)
This augmented cost weighted computation favors companies with a larger stand-
alone augmented cost, thus accounting for both logistics costs and CO2 emissions.
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5.2. Partner influence weight γi approach
To find a unique solution using model (16), without generating the Pareto front, the
value of every partner’s influence weight γi has to be fixed. These weights characterize
the influence of the companies on the final cooperative solution. To define them, we
rely again on proportional techniques, using the demand volumes or the stand-alone
augmented costs, similar to the computation of β (Section 5.1).
• Volume weighted γiV ol
Demand volumes can be used to reflect the size and negotiation power of a
company in the partnership (Cruijssen, Cools, & Dullaert, 2007). Based on this
idea, the influence weight γi of partner i is computed as the ratio of its demand
to the total demand of all partners.
γiV ol =
Λi
Λ
∀i (20)
In this way, a larger company will have more impact on collaborative decisions.
Note, however, that this method does not account for the fact that a larger
demand volume will typically allow a company to be more efficient, compared
to a smaller company. To account for that, the next method is introduced.
• Augmented cost weighted γiV ol
In this second method, the augmented cost in the stand-alone case is used to
reveal the influence of a partner. The partner influence weights, γi, are computed
as the ratio of their stand-alone augmented cost to the total augmented cost of
all partners.
γiAugC =
AugCiSA∑
k AugC
k
SA
∀i (21)
Unlike the previous method, using the augmented cost allows to account for
the economies of scale that can be achieved through higher volumes. However,
to get to the augmented cost, the costs, CO2 emissions and individual costs-
emissions weights (βi) are more difficult to assess than volumes.
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5.3. Partners benefits approach
The two previous approaches are based directly on the multi-objective models proposed
in Section 4, balancing costs versus CO2 emissions (Sections 4.1) or balancing the aug-
mented costs of the partners (4.2). The approach presented in this section looks at the
benefits that cooperation generates for the partners individually. The relative benefit
from cooperating for a partner i is computed as (AugCiSA−AugCiCoop)/AugCiSA, where
AugCiSA is the stand-alone augmented cost of partner i and AugC
i
Coop is its share of
the cooperation’s augmented cost. The main motivation for a company to engage in
a horizontal cooperation is to reduce its own costs and CO2 emissions, i.e., decrease
its individual augmented cost. In practice, a cooperation that leads to vastly different
benefits among partners may be considered unfair, at least by those that benefit less.
In the same vein, a collaborative supply network that is far from the ideal network for
one company will likely result in dissatisfaction and threatens the long-term stability
of the collaboration.
Figure 4 displays the relative benefits of each partner in a two company collabora-
tion, for the solutions of the Pareto fronts as computed in Section 4, using articulation
at the coalition level (model (13)) or articulation at the partner level (16). We observe
a range of potential benefits for both companies. In isolation, the companies would
chose very different collaborative networks, i.e., the two extreme points, leading to
their ideal benefits. In what follows, we introduce two methods for selecting one solu-
tion from these solution sets, in order to guide decision makers. Both methods do not
require the Pareto fronts to be known.
• Maximizing the minimal partner benefit, MmBenefit
Our first method aims at maximizing the lowest individual benefit a partner
gets from cooperating. It will thus lead to a solution in which the company
benefiting the less gets as much as possible, and in which the benefits gotten
by the different partners are as similar as possible. In Figure 4, this solution
(represented by a triangle) is the one closest to the line with identical benefits
for the partners. To find this solution, the following model is solved, maximizing
the smallest benefit among partners (withBenefit and AugCiCoop being variables
and AugCiSA being a parameter, computed a priori).
21
Benefit for company 1
B
en
efi
t
fo
r
co
m
p
an
y
2
Articulation at the coalition level
Articulation at the partner level
Identical benefits
Highest, ideal, benefits
Max Min Benefit
Min Max Loss
Figure 4.: Relative benefits from cooperation, in augmented costs, that can be achieved
by two companies collaborating, for the solutions found applying the articulation at
the coalition level and the articulation at the partner level.
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(5)− (10)
Benefit ≥ 0 (25)
AugCiCoop ≥ 0 ∀i (26)
Since this method leads to similar benefits among partners, it supports accep-
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tance among partners and is in line with the premise of the equal profit method
(Frisk et al., 2010). As such, it may be helpful in the early phases of a growing
horizontal cooperation for communication and negotiation purposes (Verdonck
et al., 2016). However, especially if partner characteristics and/or contributions
are very dissimilar, it can be questioned whether an equal distribution of the
benefits is desirable. Moreover, given its strive for more equal partner benefits,
this method generally affects the average savings of the solution in a negative
way. These specific cases will be numerically explored in detail in Section 6.
• Minimizing the maximal partner loss, mMLoss
This last method is based on the statement that partners ultimately desire
cooperative solutions which are as close as possible to their ideal cooperative
solution from an individual perspective, i.e. the solution that maximizes their
own benefit. The method thus aims at minimizing the maximum loss (dissatis-
faction) of each partner accounting for the cooperative solution that would be
chosen individually, similarly to the idea behind the Nucleolus method (Schmei-
dler, 1969). The solution that company i would select if it could decide alone for
the cooperation (with an augmented cost noted AugCi∗Coop) is computed a priori,
solving model (16) (Section 4.2) with influence weight γi = 1 for company i,
and zero weights for other companies. The corresponding solutions for all part-
ners are highlighted with the dashed lines in Figure 4. Note that these solutions
could be unacceptable as they might not comply with the individual rationality
principle. Accounting for this, the method finds the solution that minimizes the
maximum difference in benefits with these previously computed solutions, as il-
lustrated by the black square in Figure 4. The following model is solved, with
Loss and AugCiCoop being variables.
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As the difference between the individually desirable solution and the cooper-
ative solution is minimized, this approach will reduce the partners’ willingness
to leave the cooperation, and thus supports the long-term stability of the coop-
eration.
6. Computational Experiments
In this section, we present and discuss our experimental results in order to compare
and validate all the approaches introduced in the previous sections. First, we intro-
duce the experimental setting in Section 6.1. In Section 6.2, we discuss the working of
both approaches presented in Section 4, that lead to Pareto fronts, relying on prefer-
ence articulation at the coalition and at the partner level. In Section 6.3, we analyze
the three approaches for finding unique solutions presented in Section 5. Finally, Sec-
tions 6.4 and 6.5 study collaborations among companies that are dissimilar in size
(and therefore power) or have a different geographical demand distribution.
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Figure 5.: Joint supply network for two collaborating companies with similar demand
structures and costs-emissions preferences (β1 = β2 = 3), using the volume weighted
βV ol method (equation (18)). The dashed line distinguishes the eastern and the western
cities (see Section 6.5).
6.1. Experimental Setting
In our experiments, we focus on a cooperation between two companies, operating
in the U.S. market. The retailer’s locations are taken from the 49-node data set by
Daskin (2011), which includes the 48 continental U.S. state capitals plus Washington
DC. This data set is commonly used in the facility location literature (Jeon, Snyder,
& Shen, 2006; Santiva´n˜ez & Carlo, 2018). All retailers’ locations are considered to be
the possible locations for the DCs. This assumption is common and well-accepted in
the facility location literature (see e.g. Atamtu¨rk et al. (2012); Shen, Coullard, and
Daskin (2003)). The 49 cities and the joint supply network for a specific collaboration
are illustrated in Figure 5.
The parameter values, reflecting the characteristics of the two cooperating compa-
nies, are detailed in Table 2. These parameter values are used for both companies in
all our experiments except for the companies’ size and geographical distribution which
differ in Sections 6.4 and 6.5 (i.e. demands λir differ). In order to highlight relevant
insights, we assume that the companies share similar cost structures, but do not nec-
essarily share the same costs versus emissions preferences (βi = 1, 3 or 5 depending
on the experiments). Following Atamtu¨rk et al. (2012); Schuster Puga, Minner, and
Tancrez (2019), we use the city’s population size divided by 1000 (noted pir) as the
baseline for the retailer’s daily demand. To allow for variance in the dataset, a devia-
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tion of 25% is considered. For each company, the expected daily demand at a retailer,
λir, is randomly generated within the intervals [0.75pir; 1.25pir]. The standard deviation
of the demand is found applying a CV of 0.5 (normal distributions are assumed). The
service level is set at 97.5%. A transportation cost of 1AC/km is considered per vehicle.
The vehicle capacity is fixed at a maximum of 2500 items per vehicle. The use of a
DC involves a facility opening cost of 1000AC. The order cost and the holding costs
are 500AC per order and 0.05AC per item respectively (as in Atamtu¨rk et al. (2012);
Schuster Puga et al. (2019)). Lead times between DCs and retailers are directly pro-
portional to the distance (assuming an average speed of 50 km/h). The order lead time
from all DCs to all plants is fixed to the average lead time from all potential DCs to
all retailers. The CO2 emissions emitted by a vehicle are set to 0.857 kg/km for an
empty vehicle (e) and 1.209 kg/km for a full vehicle (f ). These values are obtained
applying the formula proposed by Hickman, Hassel, Joumard, Samaras, and Sorenson
(1999), considering a heavy-duty vehicle (maximum load of 25 tons) driving at a speed
of 50 km/h, and ignoring the gradient of the road (Pan et al., 2013). Models are im-
plemented in CPLEX and run on a 3.2 GHz computer with 8 GB of RAM. Problems
are solved to optimality both for the stand-alone and the cooperation cases.
Table 2.: Parameters values for the numerical experiments.
λir [0.75pir; 1.25pir] items/day
CV 0.5
αi 97.5%
ziα 1.96
T 1AC/km
C 2500 items
Fd 1000 AC/day
Kid 500 AC/order
hid = H
i
r 0.05 AC/item·day
e 0.857 kg/km
f 1.209 kg/km
6.2. Pareto fronts analysis
To help decision-makers negotiate a collaboration, our methods first displays the al-
ternative joint supply networks in the form of Pareto fronts. They can be computed
using a preference articulation at the coalition level (Section 4.1) or at the partner
level (Section 4.2). To illustrate these methods, the two collaborating companies, with
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similar demand structures, are supposed to have opposite costs-emissions preferences
(otherwise the two companies would be very similar, and would easily agree on their
joint supply network). One company is focused on costs minimization (β1 = 1) while
its partner is focused on emissions reduction (β2 = 5).
Figure 6 shows the resulting Pareto fronts for both preference articulations, at
the coalition level and at the partner level, as well as the balance of the benefits in
augmented cost that the partners get from cooperating (see Section 5.3). We observe
that companies first have to decide whether to open 3, 4 or 5 DCs. Then, the decisions
regarding the locations of these DCs as well as the loading rates of the vehicles will have
an additional impact on the costs-emissions balance and on the individual augmented
costs. Unsurprisingly, the results obtained with both preference articulations are not
drastically different. They rather offer variations and a wider choice of alternative
supply networks.
In Figure 6.c, we observe that no solution leads to perfectly equal relative benefits for
both companies. This is not exceptional to this instance, and may be an impediment
during the negotiation process. In this case, visualizing all possible alternative supply
networks (and thus also the non-existing ones), in the form of these Pareto fronts,
may definitely be valuable. Interestingly, although collaboration is clearly beneficial
for both partners, we see that benefits can vary between 20% and 29% for the cost-
focused company and between 22% and 27% for the emissions-focused company. This
disparity is a direct consequence of the difference in costs-emissions preferences for
both partners. We will elaborate on the impact of individual partner preferences in
more detail in the next section.
6.3. Impact of the individual costs-emissions preferences
To explore the impact of individual costs-emissions preferences (weight βi), we perform
additional experiments in which company 1 is set as a cost-focused company (β1 = 1)
while the partner’s preference is altered. First, both companies are similar, being both
cost-focused (β2 = 1). Second, company 2 focuses more on CO2 emissions (β
2 = 3).
Third, company 2 is very environmentally conscious (β2 = 5).
For each scenario, we compare the unique solutions returned by each of the three
approaches (six computation methods) introduced in Section 5: the costs-emissions
weight β can be volume weighted (equation (18), computation method denoted βV ol
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(a) Total coalition costs versus total coalition
CO2 emissions.
(b) Augmented costs for both partners.
(c) Relative benefits in augmented costs from cooperating, for both partners.
Figure 6.: Pareto fronts obtained using the articulation at the coalition level () and
the articulation at the partner level (+) for companies with different costs-emissions
preferences.
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in the following) or augmented cost weighted (equation (19), denoted βAugC); the
partner influence weight γi can also be volume weighted (equation (20), denoted γiV ol)
or augmented cost weighted (equation (21), denoted γiAugC); the partners benefits
can be used as a criterion, maximizing the minimal partner benefit (model (22)-(26),
denoted MmBenefit) or minimizing the maximal partner loss (model (27)-(31), de-
noted mMLoss). Note that, for the two last methods (MmBenefit and mMLoss),
the shipment size Qdr is computed using equations (17) and (20).
The results are summarized in Figure 7, showing the impact of the costs-emissions
preference of the second company on the collaborative benefits for both companies.
When the costs-emissions weights are the same for both companies (β1 = β2 = 1,
first bar for each method), both companies are similar in all respects: cost parameters,
demands and preferences. As a consequence, their costs and CO2 emissions reductions
from cooperating are very similar. The joint supply network is easily found and the
various methods lead to the same results.
With the increase of the second company’s weight (β2 = 3 then 5, second and
third bar for each method), the relative benefit of the collaboration decreases as the
companies have to compromise, accounting for different preferences. The cooperative
solution becomes more environmentally friendly, with higher vehicle loading rates and
in some cases the opening of additional DCs (with β2 = 5 and the three methods
βAugC , γ
i
AugC and MmBenefit). Overall, the benefit decreases weakly for company 1
and more severely for company 2. For the cost-focused company 1, the decrease in the
costs benefit (black bars) is compensated by an increase in the CO2 emissions benefit
(grey bars). In other words, the cost-focused company also benefits significantly from
the reduction in CO2 emissions enforced by the other partner. The notable exception to
that is in the cases where an additional DC is opened to satisfy the emissions-focused
company 2 (β2 = 5). The benefit for the cost-focused company drops significantly as
the additional DC largely increases the cost of the network (and the CO2 emissions
reduction does not compensate).
Looking at the second company, for which the costs-emissions weight increases,
its benefits are decreasing more severely, deviating more and more from those of its
partner. Moreover, the share of profits actually linked to CO2 emissions reductions
(grey bars) is decreasing when the costs-emissions weight increases. Although this
might seem counter-intuitive, it can easily be explained by the fact that we make use
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Figure 7.: Relative benefits in augmented cost from cooperating for cost-focused com-
pany 1 (first line) and company 2 with a changing costs-emissions preference (second
line). Groups of three bars show the benefits obtained by each company when the
costs-emissions weight increases for the second company (β2 = 1, 3, 5). The weight
does not change for company (β1 = 1). Each group of three bars, in the six columns,
is for one the six methods to propose a unique solution. Each bar is decomposed in
terms of costs and CO2 emissions reductions.
of stated preference articulation to determine the individual partner preferences. In
other words, a company that deems CO2 emissions priority, will already have low CO2
emissions when operating alone. The opportunities for decreasing the emissions even
further when collaborating are thus limited, especially if the other partner (company
1 in this case) does not value CO2 emissions reduction. In the special cases where the
second company’s strong preference for emissions reduction leads to the opening of an
additional DC, the emissions indeed drastically decrease, but the benefit is cancelled
out by the cost increase.
When the individual costs-emissions preferences differ, and companies become dis-
similar, we also see in Figure 7 that the outcomes of the six computation methods of
Section 5 diverge. To study this in more detail, we refer to Table 3, which presents,
for each method, the benefits in augmented cost obtained in a cooperation between
a cost-focused company 1 (β1 = 1) and a very environmentally conscious company 2
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(β2 = 5). To underline the fact that the methods tend to have different strengths and
weaknesses, Table 3 shows the benefits of each company, the average benefit revealing
the global efficiency of the cooperation, the difference between the benefits unveiling
the equity of the cooperation, and the difference with the ideal solution of a company
(if it would decide alone for the cooperation). We see that the volume weighted meth-
ods (βV ol and γ
i
V ol) lead to solutions with a high average benefit (25.9%), in which
the cooperation as a whole benefits the most. However, these methods lead to a high
disparity between partners (4.1%), clearly favoring the cost-focused company.
As touched upon earlier, the augmented cost weighted computation methods (βAugC
and γiAugC) lead to open an additional DC when the second company is very environ-
mentally conscious (β2 = 5). In general, these methods favor the emissions-focused
company, leading to greener supply networks and larger CO2 emissions reduction.
However, as the emissions-focused company tends to have lower profits than its cost-
focused partner, these methods counterbalance this negative impact, obtaining a lower
average for the benefits but a lower gap between augmented costs reductions. In Ta-
ble 3, we see that these methods, βAugC and γ
i
AugC , lead to the higher benefit for
the emissions-focused company 2 (25.6%), with a low difference with the benefit of
company 1 (1.5%).
The method maximizing the minimal partner benefit (MmBenefit) further reduces
the difference between the benefits of the partners (0.5%). As such, it allows to reach
a solution where neither partner feels aggrieved. This is also the method that provides
the highest minimum individual benefit (24.4%). To reach a sufficient benefit for the
emissions-focused company 2, an additional DC is opened (as mentioned earlier). The
main drawback of this method MmBenefit is that it leads to a degradation of the
average global savings level (24.7%). In short, MmBenefit is the method giving the
most priority to partner equity versus global efficiency. On the opposite, the method
minimizing the maximal partner loss (mMLoss) leads to very different benefits (4.2%)
but a more efficient supply network for the cooperation as a whole (25.9%). However,
it minimizes the gap with the ideal solutions that companies would choose if they
could decide alone for the cooperation (3.2%), and thus disincentivizes the partners
to leave the cooperation.
In conclusion, companies which are similar in terms of costs-emissions preferences
have higher average benefits, while dissimilar preferences lead to lower and more dis-
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Table 3.: Relative benefits (in %) in augmented costs from cooperating for cost-focused
company 1 (β1 = 1) and emissions-focused company 2 (β2 = 5), their average and their
difference, as well as the highest difference with the ideal cooperative solution of each
partner, as found by the six computation methods.
Costs-emissions weight Partner influence weight Partners Benefits Average
Method βV ol βAugC γ
i
V ol γ
i
AugC MmBenefit mMLoss
Benef. Comp. 1 -27.9 -24.1 -28.0 -24.1 -24.4 -28.0 -26.1
Benef. Comp. 2 -23.8 -25.6 -23.8 -25.6 -24.9 -23.8 -25.0
Average -25.9 -24.8 -25.9 -24.8 -24.7 -25.9 -25.3
Difference 4.1 1.5 4.2 1.5 0.5 4.2 2.7
Highest Diff. Ideal 3.2 4.4 3.2 4.4 4.1 3.2 3.7
parate benefits. In addition, individual benefits from cooperation are mainly coming
from an improvement of the objective which was less favored in the individual case. As
such, a cost-focused company collaborating with an emissions-focused company will
mainly enjoy significant CO2 emissions reductions. This highlights again the impor-
tance of analyzing results (also) at an individual partner level. Finally, the choice of
the solution method noticeably impacts the collaborative solution, the characteristics
of the joint supply network, its costs and emissions. The various methods could fa-
vor a reduction in costs or in CO2 emissions, one partner or the other, the reduction
of the augmented cost of the cooperation as a whole or a smaller difference between
individual benefits, or even a lower gap with the ideal cooperative solution of each
partner.
6.4. Companies with different sizes
A significant part of the literature on horizontal cooperation considers coalitions of
companies of a similar size (i.e., with similar demand). The reasons put forward to
justify this assumption are an easier benefit distribution among partners and the elim-
ination of power influence in the decision-making process (Cruijssen, Bra¨ysy, Dullaert,
Fleuren, & Salomon, 2007; Hacardiaux & Tancrez, 2019; Vanovermeire, 2014). As our
models consider the benefits distribution and the influence weights of the coalition
partners, we can use them to analyze the impact on both coalition performance and
individual benefits of having partners of different sizes in the coalition. For this, we
run a new set of experiments where the first company is twice the size of the second
company, while maintaining a similar total demand for the cooperation as previously.
The demand rate λir is computed using the formula in Table 2, with pir being the
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Table 4.: Relative benefits (in %) from cooperating for a large company 1 and a small
company 2, in augmented cost, logistics costs and CO2 emissions, depending on their
costs-emissions preferences β1 and β2.
β1/β2 = 3/3 β1/β2 = 1/5 β1/β2 = 5/1
Coop. Large C1 Small C2 Coop. Large C1 Small C2 Coop. Large C1 Small C2
Augm. costs -26.8* -16.8 -40.5 -26.6* -16.5 -37.6 -22.8* -16.2 -37.1
Logistics costs -26.5 -16.3 -40.3 -32.3 -13.0 -52.3 -26.3 -21.5 -33.9
CO2 emissions -27.2 -17.7 -40.8 -24.3 -30.7 -6.6 -30.8 -7.2 -54.1
*For the partner influence weight and partners benefits approaches, βV ol (equation (18)) is used to compute
the cooperative augmented cost.
city’s population size divided by 750 for the large company 1, and 1500 for the small
company 2 (compared to 1000 for both companies previously). Three combinations
of individual costs-emissions weights are tested, β1/β2 = 3/3, 1/5 or 5/1, to illustrate
companies with similar (3/3) or opposite (1/5 and 5/1) costs-emissions preferences.
These new instances have been solved with the six computation methods proposed
in Section 5, to get unique solutions for the collaboration. Table 4 gives the aver-
age results over the six methods, allowing us to focus on the insights related to the
cooperation’s and companies’ benefits.
Looking at Table 4, it directly appears that the relative benefits of both partners are
very different, around 16% in augmented cost for the large company and between 37%
and 40% for the small company. This is due to the fact that the large partner already
has a more effective supply network before cooperating, thanks to better economies
of scale. With equal costs-emissions weights (β1/β2 = 3/3), the costs and emissions of
the large company are only 35% and 45% larger, respectively, while its demand volume
is twice the volume of the small company. In particular, the average vehicle loading
rate for the large company in the stand-alone case is already close to 90% (for the
various costs-emissions weights combinations β1/β2). On the other hand, the small
company, when cooperating, gets access to a larger number of DCs (for which they
share the costs), better filled trucks (from 79% in the stand-alone case to around 96%
in the collaborative solutions) and more frequent deliveries (reducing inventory costs).
Cooperation is therefore more beneficial, relatively, for the small company than for its
larger partner. Companies thus best join forces with larger partners in order to fully
exploit cooperation opportunities (as also stated in Verdonck, Ramaekers, Depaire,
Caris, and Janssens (2019)).
However, the large company still benefits from a significant reduction of its costs and
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CO2 emissions (around 16% in augmented cost). Even more, interestingly, the large
company is close to reaching the full potential of the collaboration, i.e. the maximum
possible benefit, that a company would get deciding alone for the cooperation (for
all β1/β2 combinations and with most methods). For example, with costs-emissions
weights β1/β2 = 1/5, the results obtained with five of the six computation methods are
very similar, with a relative benefit in augmented costs of 17.2% for the large company
(37.4% for the small one), which is very close to its ideal cooperative solution (decided
alone) with a benefit of 17.4%. The sixth computation method, which leads to other
results, is the augmented cost weighted βAugC method. It favors the small company
even more, leading to a benefit of 39% for the small company and 13.3% for the large
one. The high costs-emissions weight of the small company (artificially) skews the
solution to favor it (even opening an additional DC). This βAugC method should thus
likely be avoided when companies do not have a demand of similar size.
Further looking at Table 4, the observation provided in Section 6.3 is even stronger
with companies of different sizes: when the partners have different costs-emissions
preferences, each company benefits most in the non-priority objective. With costs-
emissions weights β1/β2 = 1/5 for example, the large costs-focused company decreases
its CO2 emissions the most (30.7% vs. 13%), while the small emissions-focused com-
pany reduces its costs the most (52.3% vs. 6.6%). As a whole, the cooperation reduces
its costs by 32.3% and its emissions by 24.3%, showing that the priority of the larger
company for costs still clearly bends the cooperative solution. When both companies
have similar sizes (configuration of Section 6.3 and Table 3, β1/β2 = 1/5), the benefits
are more balanced, as the cooperation reduces its costs by 28.6% and its emissions by
29.3%.
6.5. Companies with different geographical demand distribution
In this section, we analyze the impact of the geographical demand distribution of the
partners on the collaboration. In these new experiments, we assume that the demand
for each company is no longer uniformly spread over all cities (while maintaining a
similar total demand for the cooperation as previously). The first company’s customers
are mostly in the West, while the second company’s customers are mostly in the East.
Company 1 has 2/3rd of its demand coming from the 25 most western cities (to the
left of the dashed line in Figures 5 and 8) and 1/3rd in the 24 most eastern cities,
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Table 5.: Relative benefits (in %) from cooperating, for a western company 1 and an
eastern company 2, in augmented cost, logistics costs and CO2 emissions, depending
on their costs-emissions preferences β1 and β2.
β1/β2 = 3/3 β1/β2 = 1/5 β1/β2 = 5/1
Coop. West C1 East C2 Coop. West C1 East C2 Coop. West C1 East C2
Augm. costs -26.3* -26.3 -26.2 -22.3* -26.7 -24.3 -24.9* -24.8 -23.1
Logistics costs -30.8 -31.2 -30.4 -30.2 -24.5 -35.1 -26.5 -32.7 -19.2
CO2 emissions -14.7 -14.8 -14.7 -24.9 -35.9 -5.2 -29.2 -13.0 -41.1
*For the partner influence weight and partners benefits approaches, βV ol (equation (18)) is used to compute
the cooperative augmented cost.
and vice versa for company 2. As in the previous section, we consider companies with
similar (β1/β2 = 3/3) or opposite (β1/β2 = 1/5 or 5/1) costs-emissions preferences,
and apply the six computation methods to get unique solutions proposed in Section
5.
Table 5 gives the average benefits for the cooperation and for both companies. As
previously, we observe that both companies have significant benefits (between 23% and
26% in augmented cost), and that companies benefit more in their non-priority crite-
rion (e.g. emissions for a cost-focused company). Interestingly, Table 5 further shows
that the company with higher demand in the west benefits slightly more (around 2%
when preferences are different). The main customers of this company, on the western
part of the map, are more spread than those of the second company, which are mainly
clustered in the east. As distances are longer to reach western cities, the benefit of
cooperation, from more DCs and better vehicle loading rates, is stronger in the west
and impacts the western company more strongly, reducing both its logistics costs and
its environmental impact. In conclusion, when companies have different geographical
demand distributions, companies with a higher demand dispersion obtain higher ben-
efits, as increased geographical coverage provides more cooperation opportunities (in
accordance with Cruijssen, Bra¨ysy, et al. (2007), Guajardo and Ro¨nnqvist (2015) and
Verdonck et al. (2019)).
Figure 8 shows that the decision process of companies forming a collaboration can
strongly impact their collaborative supply network. It is illustrated here for a col-
laboration between a western cost-focused company and an eastern emissions-focused
company. When the western cost-focused company decides alone for the cooperation,
only three DCs are opened to achieve lower costs, and their locations are skewed to-
wards the West (see Figure 8.a). When deciding alone, the eastern emissions-focused
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company prefers reducing the CO2 emissions by shortening distances. It thus opens
five DCs, of which three are in the East (see Figure 8.b). Besides these two extreme
scenarios, it is interesting to look at the methods to identify (realistic) unique solutions
proposed in Section 5. In the case illustrated in Figure 8, there is a significant difference
between the costs-emissions weight β approach on one side and the partner influence
weight γi and the partners benefits approaches on the other side. With the partner
costs-emissions weights β approach, a unique costs-emissions weight β is defined for
the cooperation and then the supply network is designed, thus not accounting for the
difference in costs-emissions preferences (βi) among partners. In Figure 8.c, a weighted
average of both βi is used to decide to open four DCs evenly spread on the map, i.e.
balancing between costs and emissions with similar priority and considering the co-
operation as a whole. It leads to an average individual partner benefit of 24.7%. On
the opposite, the partner influence weight γi and partners benefits approaches better
conserve the individuality of companies, accounting for their different costs-emissions
preferences (βi). In Figure 8.d, only three DCs are opened to reduce costs and please
the western cost-focused company, but their locations are skewed towards the east
(compared to Figure 8.a for example) to shorten distances there and reduce the car-
bon footprint of the eastern emissions-focused company. The decision thus accounts
for both partners’ preferences, leading to a higher individual average benefit of 25.9%.
In conclusion, when geographical spread and individual preferences differ, companies
should prefer applying approaches that conserve these individual preferences as they
allow to design a network that has different priorities (costs versus CO2 emissions) in
different regions.
7. Conclusions
Horizontal collaboration is considered to be a promising avenue in today’s demanding
markets requiring both efficient and sustainable logistics services. Although supply
chain partnerships promise mutual benefits for the participants, those benefits are
rarely realized due to differences in partner preferences. Despite its inherent multi-
objective nature, the majority of current research considers horizontal logistics collab-
oration as a single-objective minimization of transportation costs assuming partners
agree on a unique collaborative goal. In the best case, the effect of collaboration on
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 8.: Supply networks and DCs locations, for a western cost-focused company
1 and an eastern emissions-focused company 2 (β1/β2 = 1/5), found when the first
company decides alone for the cooperation (a), when the second company decides alone
(b), with the costs-emissions weight β approach (c) and with the partner influence
weight γi and partners benefits approaches (d).
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CO2 emissions is computed a posteriori, after costs are minimized. Based on this re-
search gap, the contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we develop a multi-objective
framework accounting for the individuality of partners in terms of their costs-emissions
preferences and their influence weights. Second, we propose new approaches for solving
our multi-objective multi-preference model; two approaches resulting in Pareto fronts
and three approaches defining unique solutions. In addition to contributing to aca-
demic research field by developing and solving new models, the proposed framework
provides quantitative decision support for practitioners implementing and managing
horizontal partnerships.
Our multi-objective collaborative location-inventory model, which is formulated as
a conic quadratic mixed integer program, accounts for the logistics costs versus CO2
emissions preferences of all partners. Moreover, it directly allocates these costs and
emissions to the partners based on efficient proportional rules which are commonly
used in practice. In order to solve the model, five solution approaches are proposed.
The two first approaches generate sets of Pareto-optimal solutions, providing useful
insights regarding the trade-off between costs and emissions for the cooperation on the
one hand, and the augmented costs of the different partners on the other hand. While
providing multiple solutions aids partners in negotiating on the collaborative strategy,
pointing at specific promising solutions is also valuable. Moreover, the complexity of
deriving and representing Pareto fronts increases with the number of partners. As
such, we propose three additional approaches to identify a unique solution, that would
be considered fair and efficient by every partner. The first two approaches compute
costs-emissions preference and partner influence weights, while the third approach is
based on the individual partner benefits that horizontal cooperation generates. For
each of these approaches, two methods are suggested, differing in terms of the way the
weights are calculated and the viewpoint on fairness of benefits.
Based on numerical experiments analyzing the performance of the developed solu-
tion approaches and the sensitivity of the results to differing instance configurations,
the following insights may be formulated. First, collaboration remains beneficial for
both partners in all cases, even if their preferences, sizes or geographies are differ-
ent. Preference weight combinations do, however, impact the individual benefits levels
of the partners, with dissimilar weights reducing the potential benefits. Furthermore,
when the partners have different costs-emissions preferences, they tend to benefit the
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most in the non-priority objective. Second, the choice of the solution approach impacts
the collaborative solution, rewarding either the partnership or a specific partner, fa-
voring a reduction in costs or in emissions, and affecting the gap between individual
benefits or with the ideal solution of each partner. Overall, the desirability of the
solution reached by each approach depends on the context of the collaboration, the
demand characteristics, the partners’ preferences and influence. Third, the importance
of partner size is confirmed. Comparatively smaller companies will tend to benefit more
than larger companies which have better economies of scale when stand-alone. Small
companies thus best attract a large partner in order to enjoy savings associated with
large joint orders. However, the larger company will still bend the collaboration to-
wards its costs-emissions preference and reach close to its ideal solution. Finally, broad
geographical coverage increases the potential benefits of cooperation. When the geo-
graphical demand distribution and preferences of the partners are dissimilar, solution
approaches accounting for the individual costs-emissions weights should be preferred.
To conclude, the following suggestions for further research can be made. One nat-
ural avenue is to include more complex allocation techniques from the literature (e.g.
Shapley value) within our optimization framework. Second, the multi-objecive, multi-
partner approach could be applied to other collaborative settings besides the location-
inventory model. According to Pan, Trentesaux, Ballot, and Huang (2019), research
on intermodal collaborations should be enhanced, for example. Finally, to further en-
hance decision support related to partner selection, the sensitivity analysis could be
extended to other cooperation configurations.
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